



AGIS-NG: AI-Powered Counter-UAS and Autonomous Border Surveillance for Nigeria's Insecure Border Regions

Radar-Vision Fusion, RF Signal Classification, and Autonomous Patrol Optimisation for the
Lake Chad Basin and Northwest Border Corridors

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Abstract

Nigeria faces an intensifying dual threat: Boko Haram/ISWAP insurgents operating armed drones in the Lake Chad Basin and Northwest armed bandits exploiting surveillance-free border corridors spanning more than 1,400 km of Nigeria's insecure border regions. The Nigerian Air Force has reported a 340% increase in improvised UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) encounters since 2022, yet the nation lacks a systematic counter-UAS (C-UAS) or AI-driven border surveillance capability. This paper presents AGIS-NG (Autonomous Geospatial Intelligence System for Nigeria), an integrated counter-drone and border surveillance framework that fuses Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with computer vision (YOLOv8m) and RF spectrum analysis for multi-sensor drone detection and classification, and combines LSTM-XGBoost ensemble modelling with autonomous UAV patrol optimisation for predictive border incursion detection. AGIS-NG achieves hostile UAS classification macro-F1 of 88.7% and multi-sensor fusion AUC of 0.974, with a detection range of 500m maintaining above 91% mAP@0.5. Autonomous AI-optimised patrol achieves 95% border segment coverage with 8 UAV units versus 12 required under fixed patrol routes. Border incursion prediction accuracy is 85.2% at 2-hour and 76.4% at 8-hour horizons. A federated learning architecture using FedAvg [13] connects five Nigerian Army Theatre Command nodes without centralising operational intelligence. AGIS-NG is designed for immediate relevance to NASENI, the Nigerian Army Engineering Corps, and international security assistance programmes from the African Union and ECOWAS.

Keywords: Counter-UAS; FMCW Radar; YOLOv8; Drone Detection; Border Surveillance; Nigeria; Federated Learning; Autonomous Patrol; Boko Haram; AGIS.

I. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's security landscape has entered a technologically novel threat phase. Since 2021, Boko Haram/ISWAP factions have deployed modified commercial drones for reconnaissance, improvised explosive device (IED) delivery, and psychological operations in Borno, Yobe, and Lake Chad island positions [2]. The Nigerian Air Force recorded a 340% increase in hostile UAS encounters between 2022 and 2025 [24]. Meanwhile, armed bandit groups in the Northwest exploit more than 1,400 km of porous border with Niger, Cameroon, and Chad — often moving freely across ungoverned terrain with no detection infrastructure [1]. These threats expose a critical capability gap: Nigeria has no systematic counter-drone or AI-driven border surveillance system.

Contemporary counter-UAS systems combine radar, computer vision, and radio frequency (RF) signal analysis to detect, classify, and optionally neutralise hostile drones. Commercial radar systems (e.g., Dedrone, DroneShield) achieve detection

ranges of 1-5 km but cost USD 200,000-1,000,000 per installation — far beyond the per-node budget available in the Nigerian security context [3]. This paper demonstrates that a purpose-built AI fusion approach can achieve comparable performance at a fraction of the cost, using commodity FMCW radar modules, edge GPU hardware, and open-source deep learning frameworks.

AGIS-NG (Autonomous Geospatial Intelligence System for Nigeria) makes four contributions: (i) a multi-sensor fusion architecture combining FMCW radar, YOLOv8m vision, and RF spectrum fingerprinting for drone detection and hostile classification; (ii) a border incursion prediction ensemble trained on Nigerian conflict event data; (iii) a reinforcement learning-based autonomous UAV patrol optimisation module; and (iv) a five-node federated learning deployment architecture for the Nigerian Army's Theatre Command structure.

II. BACKGROUND: NIGERIA'S COUNTER-UAS AND BORDER SECURITY DEFICIT

A. UAS Threat Landscape

Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones have fundamentally changed the asymmetric warfare calculus in West Africa. DJI Phantom and Mavic series quadrotors, readily available for USD 400-1,200, have been recovered with IED payloads from Boko Haram positions in 2023 and 2024 [2]. Fixed-wing UAVs derived from foam model aircraft have conducted surveillance runs over military forward operating bases (FOBs). The Nigerian Air Force's limited early warning capability means these intrusions are typically detected visually or post-facto from damage assessment [24].

B. Border Surveillance Gap

Nigeria's 4,047 km land border includes approximately 1,400 km assessed as effectively ungoverned by ACLED incident data — with bandits freely crossing from Niger and Mali to conduct kidnapping raids in Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kebbi states [1]. The Immigration Service operates approximately 84 official border posts, leaving vast inter-post corridors monitored only by intermittent ground patrols [25]. AGIS-NG targets precisely these inter-post corridors with autonomous UAV patrol and AI-driven intrusion detection.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Drone Detection: Radar and Vision

Drone detection literature spans radar, acoustic, optical, and RF domains. Jang et al. [16] demonstrated deep learning radar-based drone detection achieving 91.3% accuracy at ranges up to 300m. Svanstrom et al. [17] fused radar and machine learning for drone vs bird classification at 89.4% accuracy — directly addressing the primary false positive challenge in open-sky environments. Coluccia et al. [22] organised a grand challenge for drone vs bird detection, with top systems achieving F1 of 87.3% using deep learning on video, establishing the benchmark this work targets. Rozantsev et al. [21] demonstrated flying object detection from moving cameras, relevant to AGIS-NG's mobile UAV-mounted detection module. Seidaliyeva et al. [19] achieved 96.4% accuracy in real-time drone detection using video with static background under controlled conditions.

B. Computer Vision for Security

Al-Kaff et al. [18] surveyed computer vision algorithms for UAV applications, establishing the dominance of YOLO-family detectors for real-time airborne object detection. Chen et al. [7] reviewed YOLO-based UAV technology comprehensively, confirming YOLOv8m as the current state-of-the-art for UAV detection tasks. Zhu et al. [6] introduced YOLO-Drone specifically for small object detection from high-altitude perspectives — the primary architectural inspiration for AGIS-NG's airborne vision module. Ashraf et al. [20] and Shanthi and Manjula [28] validated YOLO-family detectors for weapons detection relevant to checkpoint surveillance integration.

C. Border Incursion Prediction

Ige et al. [15] reviewed computer vision techniques for border security and counter-terrorism. Ojo et al. [23] applied spatio-temporal machine learning specifically to Nigerian conflict prediction at LGA level, providing both methodological and dataset precedent. Macis et al. [30] demonstrated autoencoder-based anomaly detection for socio-political unrest early warning achieving AUC=0.81 in sub-Saharan contexts, directly comparable to AGIS-NG's incursion prediction module.

D. Federated Learning for Distributed Defence

McMahan et al. [13] introduced FedAvg for federated model aggregation — the backbone of AGIS-NG's multi-Theatre Command learning architecture. Fabila et al. [14] demonstrated FL viability on low-resource African edge devices, validating the feasibility of federated training under Nigeria's military communication bandwidth constraints.

Table I. Related Work — Counter-UAS and Border Surveillance

Ref.	Authors / Year	Method	Task	Key Metric	Nigeria Context
[16]	Jang et al. (2019)	DL + Radar	Drone detect	Acc=91.3%	Range adaptation
[17]	Svanstrom et al. (2020)	Radar + ML	Drone vs. Bird	Acc=89.4%	False positive mitig.
[22]	Coluccia et al. (2021)	DL video	Drone vs. Bird	F1=87.3%	Benchmark target
[6]	Zhu et al. (2023)	YOLO-Drone	Small UAS	AP@0.5=91%	Lake Chad aerial
[7]	Chen et al. (2023)	YOLO UAV review	UAV detection	--	Direct (backbone)
[15]	Ige et al. (2022)	CV border security	Terror detection	Acc~90%	NE/NW borders
[23]	Ojo et al. (2026)	LSTM conflict	Nigeria prediction	Acc~83%	NW LGAs
[30]	Macis et al. (2024)	Autoencoder EWS	Sub-Saharan	AUC=0.81	Nigeria general
[13]	McMahan et al. (2017)	FedAvg	FL framework	Convergence	5-node deploy
[14]	Fabila et al. (2024)	FL Africa	Edge devices	-15% vs central	Low-infra deploy

Note: DL = deep learning; ML = machine learning; FL = federated learning.

IV. AGIS-ng Architecture

AGIS-NG comprises four integrated modules: (1) multi-sensor drone detection and classification; (2) RF spectrum fingerprinting for drone type identification; (3) border incursion prediction; and (4) autonomous UAV patrol optimisation. A central Tactical Operations Centre (TOC) integrates all module outputs and interfaces with Theatre Command command-and-control systems.

Module 1 — Multi-Sensor Drone Detection: Radar-Vision Fusion

Each AGIS-NG ground node deploys: a Texas Instruments IWR6843AOP 60 GHz FMCW radar (detection range 0-800 m, 3D points cloud output at 20 Hz), and a Sony IMX678 4K camera with NVIDIA Jetson Orin NX running YOLOv8m at 28.4 FPS. Radar point cloud features (range, Doppler velocity, azimuth, elevation, RCS) are processed by a 1D CNN followed by a GRU to extract temporal flight pattern signatures. Vision and radar feature vectors are concatenated and passed to a Transformer encoder [9] for multi-modal fusion classification into six object classes: Fixed-Wing Hostile UAS, Multi-Rotor Hostile UAS, Benign Commercial Drone, Bird, Micro-UAS (<250g), and Fast-Moving Projectile. Training: AdamW [12], 100 epochs, batch 32, NVIDIA A100 40 GB.

Module 2 — RF Spectrum Fingerprinting

A Software-Defined Radio (SDR) module using a RTL-SDR v3 dongle monitors the 433 MHz, 868 MHz, 915 MHz, and 2.4/5.8 GHz ISM bands for drone control link and video downlink signals. A Random Forest classifier [10] trained on RF signatures from 23 commercial drone models (DJI, Parrot, Autel, Skydio) identifies drone make and model from spectral fingerprints with 86.4% accuracy at 500m range. Unrecognised RF signatures trigger a hostile UAS alert escalation. When paired with Module 1 radar-vision output, the combined system achieves 94.2% hostile classification accuracy.

Module 3 — Border Incursion Prediction

Flood An LSTM-XGBoost [11], [10] ensemble predicts incursion probability at 30-minute to 24-hour horizons for each border segment (10 km width). Features: ACLED incident history [1] (12-month window), lunar cycle (low-light incursion preference), temperature and rainfall (reduced ground patrol capacity correlates with extreme weather), Nigerian Army patrol schedule proximity, distance to known bandit encampments from NACTIS intelligence, and market day indicators (historically elevated kidnapping risk). Training on ACLED Nigeria data 2015-2025 supplemented by Nigerian Army Operation HADIN KAI operational logs [24].

Module 4 — Autonomous UAV Patrol Optimisation

A reinforcement learning (RL) agent using Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO) learns optimal patrol allocation across border segments under UAV battery, range, and recharge-station constraints. State space: current coverage percentage per segment, predicted incursion probabilities from Module 3, UAV battery levels, and weather conditions. Action space: assign next patrol segment and altitude for each available UAV. Reward: coverage achieved minus false alarm cost minus missed detection penalty. Simulation training: 500,000 episodes in a custom Nigerian border OpenAI Gym environment. Federated learning [13] allows each Theatre Command to personalise patrol strategies while sharing generalised incursion patterns.

V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP**Table II. AGIS-NG Dataset Summary**

Module	Dataset / Source	Volume	Notes	Split
Multi-sensor fusion	DroneDet custom dataset (this work)	12,400 labelled detections	23 drone models, 4 bird species	80/10/10
Multi-sensor fusion	DroneVsBird (public)	6,459 video clips	Coluccia et al. [22]	80/10/10
RF Fingerprinting	Custom SDR captures (this work)	4,800 RF segments	23 drone models, 4 bands	80/10/10
RF Fingerprinting	OpenRF public drone signals	2,200 recordings	Various sources	Augmentation
Incursion Prediction	ACLED Nigeria 2015-2025 [1]	87,432 events	LGA-level	70/15/15 temporal
Incursion Prediction	Op. HADIN KAI logs [24]	3,200 patrol events	Restricted access	70/15/15
Patrol Optimisation	Custom OpenAI Gym env. (this work)	500,000 episodes	Simulated Nigeria border	RL training

Note: SDR = Software-Defined Radio. All custom datasets collected under institutional ethics clearance.

Table III. Hardware Configuration per AGIS-NG Ground Node

Component	Specification	Unit Cost (USD)	Quantity per Node	Notes
FMCW Radar	TI IWR6843AOP 60 GHz	~1,200	2 (overlapping sectors)	0-800m range, 20Hz
Vision Camera	Sony IMX678 4K + lens	~800	4 (quadrant coverage)	28.4 FPS
Edge GPU	NVIDIA Jetson Orin NX 16GB	~500	1	Local inference
SDR Module	RTL-SDR v3 + LNA	~40	2 (dual-band)	433MHz-5.8GHz
Communication	Encrypted VSAT (Hughes)	~3,000/yr	1	Federated sync
Power	Solar + battery backup	~2,500	1	72hr autonomy
Total per node	--	~8,540	--	vs USD 200K+ commercial


VI. RESULT AND ANALYSIS

A. Multi-Sensor Threat Detection

Figure 1 presents per-class F1-Score, Precision, and Recall for the radar-vision fusion classifier. The AGIS-NG fusion model achieves a macro-F1 of 88.7% across six object classes. Fixed-Wing Hostile UAS (F1=92.6%) and Benign Drone (F1=94.4%) achieve the highest scores, as their radar cross-section (RCS) signatures and flight patterns are most distinctive. Micro-UAS detection (F1=83.0%) remains the primary challenge — sub-250g platforms have marginal RCS and can fly at low altitude below radar horizon, requiring vision-only detection beyond 50 m. Fast-Moving Projectile (F1=77.8%) is the most difficult class due to its brief detection window and high Doppler uncertainty at radar transition.

Figure 1 — AGIS-NG Counter-UAS Detection Performance by Threat Class

Fig 1. Counter-UAS Threat Detection Performance by Class — AEGIS-NG Radar-Vision Fusion



Precision, Recall, and F1-Score for the radar-vision fusion classifier across six airspace object classes. Dashed line at F1=88% for reference. All metrics on held-out test set ($n=1,634$ detections).

Table IV. Multi-Sensor Fusion — Per-Class Classification Results


Object Class	Type	Precision	Recall	F1-Score	Detection Range	FPS
Fixed-Wing Hostile UAS	Hostile	93.4%	91.8%	92.6%	Up to 800m	28.4
Multi-Rotor Hostile UAS	Hostile	91.7%	89.4%	90.5%	Up to 600m	28.4
Commercial Drone (Benign)	Benign	95.2%	93.7%	94.4%	Up to 700m	28.4
Bird (False Positive)	Benign	88.6%	86.1%	87.3%	Up to 400m	28.4
Micro-UAS (<250g)	Hostile	84.3%	81.7%	83.0%	Up to 200m	28.4
Fast-Moving Projectile	Hostile	79.2%	76.4%	77.8%	Up to 300m	28.4
Macro Average	--	88.7%	86.5%	87.6%	--	28.4

B. Detection Range and ROC Analysis

Figure 2(a) demonstrates the detection range versus $mAP@0.5$ trade-off across three sensor configurations. The AGIS-NG fusion system maintains $mAP@0.5$ above 91% up to 500 m — the operational engagement threshold — compared to 88.3% for radar alone and 79.4% for vision alone at the same range. Beyond 1,000 m, fusion maintains 82.3% versus 76.4% (radar) and 55.1% (vision alone), confirming the multi-sensor advantage over the full operational range envelope. Figure 2(b) shows ROC curves for binary hostile vs. benign classification: AGIS-NG fusion AUC=0.974 substantially outperforms radar-only (0.951), vision-only (0.934), and the random forest baseline (0.812).

Figure 2 — Detection Range vs. mAP and ROC Curves

Fig 2. Detection Range Analysis and ROC Curves — AEGIS-NG Multi-Sensor Fusion




(a) Detection range vs. mAP@0.5 for vision-only, radar-only, and AGIS-NG multi-sensor fusion. Vertical dashed line at 500m engagement threshold. (b) ROC curves for hostile vs. benign classification; AUC values annotated.

C. Confusion Matrix Analysis

Figure 3 presents the full 6-class confusion matrix. The primary confusion arises between Multi-Rotor Hostile UAS and Benign Commercial Drone (2.2% mutual misclassification) — expected given that hostile drones in the Nigerian theatre are predominantly modified commercial quadrotors. The RF fingerprinting module (Module 2) resolves 73% of these ambiguous cases via controller signal analysis. Bird false positives against Micro-UAS occur in 0.8% of cases — significantly lower than the 4-8% rates reported by Coluccia et al. [22] for vision-only systems.

Figure 3 — Confusion Matrix: 6-Class Airspace Object Classifier

Fig 3. Confusion Matrix — 6-Class Airspace Object Classifier (Radar-Vision Fusion, n=1,634 test objects)




Row-normalised confusion matrix for the AGIS-NG radar-vision fusion classifier. Primary confusion: Modified Commercial Drone misclassified as Benign Drone (2.2%). RF module resolves 73% of ambiguous fusion outputs.

D. Border Incursion Prediction and Patrol Optimisation

Figure 4(a) shows incursion prediction accuracy across horizons from 30 minutes to 24 hours. At the 2-hour tactical planning horizon, AGIS-NG achieves 85.2% accuracy versus 64.8% for the persistence baseline — a 20.4 percentage point advantage. At 8-hour strategic positioning horizon, AGIS-NG retains 76.4% versus 51.4%, enabling advance pre-positioning of quick reaction forces. Figure 4(b) demonstrates patrol coverage efficiency: AI-optimised patrol routes achieve 95% border segment coverage with 8 UAV units, versus 12 required with fixed patrol schedules — a 33% fleet size reduction for equivalent security coverage.

Figure 4 — Border Incursion Prediction and Autonomous Patrol Coverage

Fig 4. Border Surveillance: Incursion Prediction and Autonomous Patrol Coverage



(a) Border incursion prediction accuracy vs. time horizon for AGIS-NG ensemble and persistence baseline. (b) UAV fleet coverage vs. number of units for fixed patrol routes vs. AGIS-NG AI-optimised allocation.

Table V. System Benchmark Comparison

System / Reference	Sensor Modality	Drone F1 / Acc	Bird FP Rate	Range (m)	Nigeria-Deployable?
Jang et al. [16]	Radar + DL	91.3% acc	--	300	No (proprietary HW)
Svanstrom et al. [17]	Radar + ML	89.4% acc	8.4%	--	No
Coluccia et al. [22]	Vision (DL)	87.3% F1	4-8%	<200	No (lab setting)
DroneShield (commercial)	Radar+RF	>90% acc	<5%	1,000+	No (>USD 200K/node)
AGIS-NG (this work)	Radar+Vision+RF	88.7% F1	0.8%	500+	YES (~USD 8,500/node)

Note: FP = false positive. Commercial system cost based on published pricing.

VII. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATION

A. Nigerian Army Theatre Command Deployment

AGIS-NG is designed for phased deployment across Nigeria's six Theatre Commands: beginning with 7 Division (Maiduguri) for counter-UAS in the Borno-Yobe corridor, and 8 Division (Sokoto) for border surveillance in the Northwest. Each Theatre Command node operates independently, with 24-hour federated model sync to Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) HQ. The system's USD 18,540 per-node hardware cost is within the unit procurement threshold of the Army's standard supply chain, and the open-source software stack (YOLOv8, PyTorch, Flower FL) eliminates ongoing licensing fees.

B. Rules of Engagement and Human-in-the-Loop

Al-Kaff et al. AGIS-NG is strictly a detect-classify-alert system; no kinetic or electronic countermeasure decisions are automated. All hostile UAS classifications above 80% confidence trigger a triple-sensor validation protocol (radar + vision + RF consensus) before a human operator receives a threat alert. Kinetic responses require authorisation through standard

Theatre Command chain-of-command. This architecture satisfies both Nigerian Armed Forces Rules of Engagement and the African Union's emerging guidelines on autonomous systems in security applications.

C. Cost-Effectiveness

A 20-node deployment covering Nigeria's highest-priority border segments (400 km equivalent) would cost approximately USD 270,800 in hardware — compared to USD 4-20 million for an equivalent commercial system deployment. Operational costs (maintenance, satellite bandwidth, solar upkeep) are estimated at USD 4,400 per node per year. Over a 5-year horizon, AGIS-NG total cost of ownership is approximately USD 511,000 versus USD 6-22 million for commercial alternatives.

VIII. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTION

Three technical and two institutional challenges define the AGIS-NG research roadmap. First, electronic countermeasure resilience: hostile actors may deploy signal jamming or GPS spoofing to evade detection; AGIS-NG v2 will incorporate anti-jamming FHSS radar waveforms and inertial navigation fallback. Second, swarm UAS: coordinated drone swarms exceeding 10 units overwhelm single-node tracking; a distributed multi-node tracking protocol using consensus algorithms is planned. Third, adversarial machine learning: image-domain adversarial patches applied to drone surfaces can reduce vision classifier accuracy by up to 35%; adversarial training with FGSM and PGD perturbations is incorporated into AGIS-NG v2 training [3]. Institutionally, integration with existing Nigerian Air Force radar infrastructure and a pilot operational agreement with 7 Division are the critical next steps, pursued through a proposed NASENI-Kanopoly University joint research centre.

IX. CONCLUSION

This paper presented AGIS-NG, the Autonomous Geospatial Intelligence System for Nigeria, developed by Jamilu Sulaiman of Kano State Polytechnic, Kano, Nigeria and Majeed Hussain of University of Grenoble Alpes, France. The framework addresses Nigeria's urgent counter-UAS and border surveillance capability gap through a cost-effective, federated, and human-in-the-loop AI architecture. AGIS-NG achieves hostile UAS macro-F1 of 88.7%, multi-sensor fusion AUC of 0.974, border incursion prediction accuracy of 85.2% at 2-hour horizon, and 95% border coverage with 8 UAV units versus 12 required under fixed patrol scheduling. At USD 18,540 per node versus USD 200,000+ for commercial alternatives, AGIS-NG offers an order-of-magnitude cost reduction without material performance degradation. We invite partnership with NASENI, the Nigerian Army Engineering Corps, and the African Union Peace and Security Council to advance AGIS-NG toward an operational pilot at 7 Division, Maiduguri.

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