



Research Article

# Corporations' Attributes and Auditors' Fees: An Empirical Evaluation of Key Corporate Audit Matters Impact in Nigeria

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## Abstract

The continuous researches and quests aimed at assuaging the information disproportionateness of Management report to enhance the value of information content and form of the stylized, specific traditional audit report lacking pertinence and suitability to its users for economic functioning has now found a key communication channel between the corporation and its investors with the new extended audit reform, Disclosure of Key Corporate Audit Matters (KCAMD). The drive of this study is to explore whether the moderating effect of KCAMD may significantly predict Audit Fees among listed corporations in Nigeria in light of the relationship between Audit Concerns' Magnitude, Corporations Magnitude, Corporations Age, and the amount of Audit Fees received by Auditors. The organized empirical pooled data from 2008 to 2022 were analysed by regression based on linear models designed in agreement with the proposed hypotheses and we found that KCAMD has significant influence on ADTFES. As well, measures of auditors and auditees' individualities (ADCNMG, CPTMAG, and CPTAGE) were found to have joint significant effect on ADTFES. Decisively, the study documents that KCAMD was capable of significantly influencing the relationship between the selected measures of auditors and auditees' individualities (ADCNMG, CPTMAG, CPTAGE) and ADTFES.

**Keywords:** Extended Audit Report, Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure, Auditees' Individualities, Audit Concerns' Magnitude, Audit Efforts.

**JEL Classification:** M41, M42

## Introduction

The continuous researches and quests aimed at assuaging the information disproportionateness of Management report to enhance the value of information content and form of the stylized, specific traditional audit report lacking pertinence and suitability to its users for economic functioning has now found a key communication channel between the corporation and its investors with the new extended audit reform. The year 2016 witnessed the official compliance to a fundamental reform in the auditing of financial reports by auditors as Nigerian regulators and standard setters adopts the International Standards on Auditing (ISA 701). (Ozcan, 2021; Shao, 2020; Li, 2020; Lee & Phua, 2019)

The recent changes in auditing processes conveyed in the ISA 701 that necessitated the extended audit reports hinged on further communicating key audit matters according to literatures (Al Lawati & Hussainey, 2022; Hong, Hay & Lau, 2019) are susceptible to enhancing an auditor's accountability and professional skepticism and reduce information asymmetry, which will result in improving quality of audit reporting. This new disclosure requirement which is intended to further increased audit quality and meet the users expectations will not only increased the complexity of the auditor responsibilities; usurp auditors time and resources but also capable of posing higher pressure on the auditors that would be impacting on the auditors drearily (Kitiwong & Sarapaivanich, 2020; Bédard, Gonthier-Besacier, & Schatt, 2019; Elif & Erdem, 2021).

According to ISA 701, the Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure (KCAMD) should be determined by the Auditor in his own professional judgement and to disclose the most important issues based on the auditor's professional judgment in the auditing of financial statements. The KCAMD in the audit reports are predisposed to the influence of certain factors from auditors and corporations being audited. The examination of these factors does not only enable us to determine the quality of audit and by extension the audit fees charged by auditors but also create opportunity for users understandability of the report (Walid, 2012; Mugo, & Makori, 2018, Ebirien & Chukwu, 2021). According to Ferreira and Morais (2019), the relation between the auditors and the auditees plays a vital role regarding the number of KAMS to be disclosed; as there could be conflict of interest as to being exposed to loss of reputation arising from litigation on one hand and the possible loss of a client on the other hand. (Gold, Heilmann, Pott, & Rematzki, 2020, Zeng, Zhang, Zhang, & Zhang, 2021)

The work of Chen, Jiang, and Zhang in 2019 provides a useful perspicacity on the relationship between how disclosure of audit quality affect audit efforts. This is corroborated by the study of Hu, landsman, Xiao and Zhao (2023) that documented that migrating from non-disclosure to disclosure increases audit effort; that with low reporting system, auditors are more prone to mistakes leading to issuance of unqualified audit opinions in place of qualified opinions asserting that investors would sue auditors for compensation for use of low quality report they use not for its information value but its insurance value. With this on mind, auditors exercise higher effort that would increase audit quality and consequently a supposed reason for the new trends of auditors' remuneration. Literatures (Walid, 2012, Shao, 2020; Hussin, Md Salleh, Ahmad & Rahmat, 2023; Aronmwan & Okafor, 2015; Gold et al, 2020, Onatuyeh & Nwabuko, 2016) noted that both the audited corporation and auditing firm influence the extent of KCAMD and this in turn influence the auditors expected remuneration, but the magnitude and Scope of this effect have not been examined in dept. In recent times, re-examining the factors that birthed the new trends of audit fees charged by auditors for auditing services has now become very paramount to the sustainability of both the auditors and the auditees. This study intends to combine both the auditees and the auditors' characteristics namely Corporations age, Corporations Magnitude (for Auditees), Audit Firm Magnitude and KCAMD (for Auditors) in determining the relationship existing between audit fees and auditors/auditees characteristics. Consequently, this paper seeks to provide clarifications to the following questions drawn from the objective of the study:

1. To what extent does KCAMD predict Auditors Fees?
2. How well do auditors/auditees characteristics predict Auditors Fees?
3. How does KCAMD affect the relationship between auditors/auditees characteristics and Auditors Fees?

## **Literature Review and Conceptual Framework**

### **Audit Fees and KCAMD**

Auditors who are required by the new ISA 701 to determine and disclose KAMS as part of the requirements in an audited financial statement are required to exercise professional judgment. While some scholars (Boonyanet & Promsen, 2019; Sakin & Kuzu Yıldırım, 2022) hold the view that the introduction of KCAMD does not have additional informative value and by way of reasoning should not influence audit fees, others have seen the implementation of the new extended audit report, KCAMD as requiring extra and higher efforts leading to extra costs leading to increasing audit fees (Jati & Suprasto, 2020; Chen, Nelson, Wang, & Yu, 2020).

### **Audit Fees and Auditees' Characteristics (Corporations Age and Corporations Magnitude)**

Auditors' fees paid by corporations for auditing services (essential input desired for audit engagements) are determined by the volume of time spent coupled with the form and nature auditing services (number of transactions) undertaken by the auditors as contained in the engagement/contract letter. These desired obligations in the audit engagements that formed the underlying determinants of audit fees, according to literatures are inclusive of the age and the magnitude of the auditees or corporations being audited (Adejuwon & Akinola, 2023; Obafemi, Yisa & Abdullahi, 2020).

Studies have documented the existence of strong link between the Corporations Magnitude and audit fees that made all the "big-4s" audit firms consider Corporations Magnitude in determination of suitable audit fees. Some studies argued that the existence advanced accounting and domiciled standard internal control system in bigger corporation help to lessen the auditors work and consequently less audit fees (Musa, Salman, Amoo, & Subair, 2020) while others documented otherwise (Otemu, 2019). Consequently, the age of corporation could also be a determining factor influencing its capability to engage any of the "big-4s" audit firms and be able to pay their audit fees.


### **Audit Fees and Auditors' Characteristics (Audit Firm Magnitude and KCAMD)**

Detecting and reporting material misstatement in audit report is largely dependent on the availability of classy know-how and requisite expertise. Highly rated auditors have the capability to discover aggressive earnings management practices and as such corporations audited by them low abnormal accrual compared to corporations audited by low-profiled quality auditors. Thus, the higher the magnitude of the audit firms, the more generally acclaimed reputation and who would do everything to protect such status by scowling at corporations reporting malfeasances that may lead to litigation risks

(Onatuyeh & Nwabuko, 2016; Omer, 2021). The study of Kajola, Sanyaolu, and Adeyemi (2021) opined that there was a significant positive relationship between Audit Firm Magnitude and financial reporting quality.

The auditor being responsible for KCAMD reporting, it is pertinent for the auditor to undertake and intensify the level of scrutiny and, exhibit a higher level of professional incredulity (Asbahr & Ruhnke, 2019). It is expected that the identification classification and the eventual disclosure of KAMS by auditors depends largely on the know-how and the magnitude of the auditing firm in relation to the availability of time and resource molded up into higher efforts put in by auditors which literatures suggested are passed to corporations in form of higher audit fees. (Elmarzouky, Hussainey & Abdelfattah, 2023; Reid, Carcello, Li & Neal, 2019, Mukah, Fossung, Berthelo, & Nyuykighan, 2021). Reid et al. (2019) work documented that KCAMD and the audit cost have insignificant relationship; while Jati and Suprasto (2020) argued that the pressure of higher efforts by auditors may increase audit fees. However, the earlier works of Gold and Heilmann (2019) offered a contrary view that audit fees do not increase as a result of KCAMD implementation.

Thus, the drive of this study is to collect empirical data on the effect of Corporations Age, Corporations Magnitude, Audit Firm Magnitude and KCAMD on Audit Fees. We therefore explore whether the moderating effect of KCAMD may significantly predict Audit Fees among listed corporations in Nigeria in light of the relationship between Audit Firm Magnitude, Corporations Magnitude, Corporations Age, and the amount of Audit Fees received by Auditors.



**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework**

Founded on the conceptual framework and research questions earlier posed, we hypothesize as follows:

H<sub>01</sub>: KCAMD cannot significantly predict the amount of Audit Fees received by Auditors.

H<sub>02</sub>: Audit Firm Magnitude, Corporations Magnitude, and Corporations Age do not significantly predict the amount of Audit Fees received by Auditors.

H<sub>03</sub>: KCAMD does not have significant influence on the relationship between Audit Firm Magnitude Corporations Magnitude, Corporations Age, and the amount of Audit Fees received by Auditors.

### Methodological Approach

This study is rooted in the Ex-post facto research design that utilized secondary data obtained from annual reports of companies in Nigeria pooled over a period of 2008 to 2022 (15years). A total of 549 firm-year observations were selected using judgmental sampling, which included 39 financial service firms out of the total of 49 as of 31<sup>st</sup> December 2022. The organized empirical pooled data were analysed based on linear models designed in agreement with the proposed hypotheses.

## Variables Measurement

**Table 1: Variables Description and Definition**

Variables	Metrics	Label	Measurement
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	Audit Fees	<b>ADTFES</b>	Measured as the ratio of Audit Fees received to Total Revenue
<b>Independent Variables</b>	Audit Firm Magnitude	<b>ADFMMG</b>	Measured as the choice of a sampled company to employ the services of any of the Big-4 audit firms. A dummy value of '1' is used or '0' if otherwise.
	Corporations Magnitude	<b>CPTMAG</b>	Measured as the Log of Total Assets
	Corporations Age	<b>CPTAGE</b>	Measured as the firm's listing age on NGX
<b>Moderating Variable</b>	Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure	<b>KCAMD</b>	Measured as the numbers (Count) of Key Audit Matters Disclosed in the Auditors Independent Report
<b>Control Variable</b>	Corporation Leverage	<b>CPTLEV</b>	Measured as the ratio of Total Debts to Total Assets

## Empirical Model Specifications

The earlier stated propositions were tested using these linear models:

$$ADTFES_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 KCAMD_{it} + \alpha_2 CPTLEV_{it} + \varepsilon_t \dots \dots \dots \text{Model 1}$$

$$ADTFES_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 ADFMMG_{it} + \alpha_2 CPTMAG_{it} + \alpha_3 CPTAGE_{it} + \alpha_4 CPTLEV_{it} + \varepsilon_t \dots \dots \dots \text{Model 2}$$

$$ADTFES_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 ADFMMG_{it} + \alpha_2 CPTMAG_{it} + \alpha_3 CPTAGE_{it} + \alpha_4 CPTLEV_{it} + \alpha_5 KCAMD_{it} + \varepsilon_t \dots \dots \dots \text{Model 3}$$

## Analysis, Result and Discussion

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics**

Variables	ADTFES	ADFMMG	CPTMAG	CPTAGE	CPTLEV	KCAMD
<b>Obsn</b>	549	549	549	549	549	549
<b>Mean</b>	0.3958	0.6339	7.8459	18.0656	66.9881	1.3916
<b>Std Dtn</b>	0.4653	0.4822	0.9917	12.9156	33.6709	1.8624
<b>Mn VI</b>	0	0	6.42	1	7.1	0
<b>Mx VI</b>	4.67	1	10.07	54	256.22	7

Evidence from the descriptive statistics in Table 2 above revealed that Audit fee (ADTFES) measured as a ratio of audit fees to total revenue has a mean ratio of 0.3958 and a deviation of 0.4653 from the mean; an indication that corporations in the Nigerian financial service sector on the average paid approximately 39.5% of their total revenue as audit fees with a relatively high variation of 0.465% suggesting that there is a substantial differences between Audit Fees paid by the sampled corporations in the study. It further revealed that Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG) measured by the capability to employ the services of any of the Big-4 Audit Firms has 0.6339 and 0.4822 as mean and standard deviation respectively. A mean value of 0.6 suggests that most corporations employ the services of the Big-4; with a 0.48% variation around its mean value signifying significant differences among choice of auditing firm engaged.

Regarding Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG) measured by log of total assets that recorded the mean and standard deviation of 7.8459 and 0.9917 respectively. This large deviation is an indication that the Total Assets of some firms are exponentially at variance with the total Assets recorded by some other corporations in the same or similar industry during the study period. Corporations Age (CPTAGE) measured by corporation listing age on Nigerian Exchange Group having

mean values of 18.0656 and standard deviation of 12.9156 respectively indicating that corporations under study have been listed for 18 years with a low dispersion of 12% signifying corporations under review show similar trend with the industry where a maximum age of listed corporations is 54 years.

As regards the Moderating Variable of the study, Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) measured as the number/count of Key Audit Matters disclosed in the independent report of the Auditor, revealed a mean of 1.3916 and standard deviation of 1.8624 reporting that corporations sampled disclosed at least one (1) KCAMD and the low deviation is an indication that the reported values for individual corporations are not largely different from each other. On the Control Variable, Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV) measured as ratio of debt to assets, showed a mean of 66.9881 and a standard deviation of 33.6709 signifying that on the average 66.9% of ownership structure serviced the debt of sampled corporations while a deviation of 33.6%, large deviation, indicates that the sampled corporations within the study period exhibit enormous variance with the leverages recorded by some other corporations in the same or similar industry.

**Table 3: Correlation Matrix**

Variables	ADTFES	ADFMMG	CPTMAG	CPTAGE	KCAMD	CPTLEV
<b>ADTFES</b>	1.0000					
<b>ADFMMG</b>	0.0041	1.0000				
<b>CPTMAG</b>	-0.2678	0.5270	1.0000			
<b>CPTAGE</b>	-0.1709	0.3095	0.4542	1.0000		
<b>KCAMD</b>	-0.0443	0.1376	0.2443	0.3750	1.0000	
<b>CPTLEV</b>	0.0283	0.2360	0.5037	0.2099	0.1422	1.000

Table 3 showed indicators from the correlation result that ADFMMG and CPTLEV had positive coefficients for ADTFES suggesting that; a rise of one unit in ADFMMG and CPTLEV will probably cause ADTFES to increase by 0.0041 and 0.0283 units, respectively. Conversely, CPTMAG, CPTAGE and KCAMD had negative coefficients for ADTFES suggesting that; a rise in CPTMAG, CPTAGE and KCAMD will probably cause ADTFES to decrease by 0.2678, 0.1709 and 0.0443 respectively. Furthermore, the table revealed that all variables coefficients are less than the threshold of 0.8 thus confirming the absence of multicollinearity issues.

**Table 4: Multicollinearity Result**

Variables	CPTMAG	CPTMAG	ADFMMG	CPTLEV	KCAMD
<b>VIF</b>	1.98	1.40	1.40	1.34	1.17
<b>1/VIF</b>	0.504674	0.712657	0.714825	0.744031	0.851361
<b>MEAN VIF</b>					<b>1.46</b>

The VIF table above submits VIF levels from 1.17 (KCAMD) to 1.98 (CPTMAG). With the maximum degree of tolerance being 0.851361 (KCAMD); whereas the mean VIF was 1.46, we reaffirm that the data for this study do not exhibit evidence of multicollinearity since the mean VIF was under the critical Value of 10.

**Table 5: Heteroscedasticity Result**

Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test		
<b>Chi2(1)</b>	-	<b>19.92</b>
<b>Prob &gt; Chi</b>	-	<b>0.0000</b>

The B-P/CW result showed a Chi2(1) of 19.92 and p-value of 0.0000 which is less than 0.05 confirms the existence of heteroskedasticity implying that relying on our OLS result would be misleading.

**Table 6: Normality Test**

Variables	Obsn	W	V	Z	Prob>z
ADTFES	549	0.60565	144.328	12.002	0.00000
ADFMMG	549	0.99890	0.404	-2.189	0.98572
CPTMAG	549	0.87921	44.208	9.146	0.00000
CPTAGE	549	0.91770	30.122	8.220	0.00000
KCAMD	549	0.94620	19.690	7.194	0.00000
CPTLEV	549	0.86342	49.987	9.443	0.00000

Table 6 above showed that the substantial values of the Shapiro Wilk W test (Prob>z) is 0.98572 which is greater than 0.05 for ADFMMG while the rest variables have 0.0000. This signified that the data significantly exhibit a normal distribution. Since all the conditions required for an OLS regression analysis could not met, our test of Hypotheses was therefore based on the outcome from the Robust regression analysis as shown below.

### Hypotheses Analysis and Discussion

**Table 7: Test of Hypothesis Result (Regression Results)**

Dependent Variable = Audit Fees (ADTFES)			
Independent Variable	[Model 1] Hypothesis 1	[Model 2] Hypothesis 2	[Model 3] Hypothesis 3
C	0.3308915*** (0.000)	0.9899209*** (0.000)	0.9913166*** (0.000)
KCAMD	-0.010448** (0.014)		-0.0060825 (0.157)
ADFMMG		0.2614314*** (0.000)	0.2633214*** (0.000)
CPTMAG		-0.1044299*** (0.000)	-0.103865*** (0.000)
CPTAGE		-0.0014202** (0.027)	-0.0011208 (0.098)
CPTLEV	-0.0008391*** (0.000)	-0.0003611 (0.153)	-0.0004097 (0.107)
OBSN	549	549	549
F-Stat	11.03***	66.47***	54.23***
Prob > F	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)

\*Significant at 10%; \*\*significant at 5%; \*\*\*significant at 1%

Table 7 presents the outcomes of tested hypotheses. For Model I; testing hypothesis I, Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) and the control variable Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV) displays negative association with Audit Fees (ADTFES). Accordingly, as Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) and the level of Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV) grow in magnitude, the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services reduces. The p-value of 0.014 shows that at 5% significance level, KCAMD exerts significant influence on ADTFES. Likewise, the value of F-stat which is 11.03 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0000 connotes that Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count exerts significant influence on Audit Fees received by auditors. Based on



this, we reject hypothesis I and conclude that Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) significantly predicts the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services of listed corporations in Nigeria.

Test of hypotheses II result as in Model II in Table 7 above reveals that Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV), Corporations Age (CPTAGE) and Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG) displayed negative regression coefficients of -0.0003611, -0.0014202, and -0.1044299 respectively evincing that as Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV) increases alongside maintaining going concern in the form of Corporations Age (CPTAGE) and increase in the magnitude of Corporations (CPTMAG), the Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors tend to shrink in quantity. However, Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG) shown positive association with Audit Fees (ADTFES); demonstrating that a unit increase in tendencies of listed corporations engaging any one or more of the Big-4s Audit Firms will result to paying higher Audit Fees (ADTFES). The p-value of 0.000 shows that at 1% significance level, Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG) and Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG) exert a very significant positive and negative influence respectively on the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services while a p-value of 0.027 shows that at 5% significance level, Corporations Age (CPTAGE) exerts significant negative influence on the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services. Equally, the value of F-stat (66.47); p value (0.0000), implies that Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG), Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG), Corporations Age (CPTAGE) and Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV) jointly exerts significant influence on the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services. This result is significant at 1%. Following this result, we then reject hypothesis II and conclude that Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG), Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG), Corporations Age (CPTAGE) and Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV) individually and jointly significantly predict the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services of listed corporations in Nigeria.

In addition, Model III testing hypotheses III established result that are consistent with the results of Hypotheses I and II, KCAMD, CPTMAG, CPTAGE and CPTLEV had negative regression coefficients of -0.0060825, -0.103865, -0.0011208, and -0.0004097 respectively. Apparently, as Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) increases alongside with increase in the magnitude of Corporations (CPTMAG), increase in maintaining going concern in the form of Corporations Age (CPTAGE) and increase in Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV), the Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors tend to shrink in quantity. On the other hand, Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG) shown positive association with Audit Fees (ADTFES); demonstrating that a unit increase in tendencies of listed corporations engaging any one or more of the Big-4s Audit Firms will result to paying higher Audit Fees (ADTFES). The p-values for KCAMD, Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG) and CPTMAG (0.000, 0.000 and 0.000 respectively) demonstrates that at 1% significance level, Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD), and Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG), exert a very significant negative influence while Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG) exerts a very significant negative influence on the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services.

Noticeably, when Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) was introduced into the model (CPTMAG), Corporations Age (CPTAGE), and the amount of Audit Fees (ADTFES) received by Auditors (see Model III), Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) itself that had initial p-value of 0.014 that exerted significant influence at 5% (as in Model I) now have a p-value of 0.157 that exert a very insignificant influence on ADTFES at 5% level. More so, Corporations Age (CPTAGE) with initial p-value of 0.027 exerting significant influence on Audit Fees (ADTFES) at 5% (see Model II), now had a p-value of 0.098; thus exerting insignificant influence on ADTFES at 5% level (as in Model III) while the control variable, Corporations Leverage (CPTLEV) having an initial p-value of 0.000 exerting a significant influence at 5% (as in Model I), p-value of 0.153 (as in Model II) now have a p-value of 0.107 that exert a very insignificant influence on ADTFES at 5% level (as in Model III). Nonetheless, the study established that the value of F-stat which is 54.23 had 0.0000 as its corresponding p-value. This however, connotes that the insertion of KCAMD into Model III produced a more significant result. As a result, we therefore reject hypothesis III and conclude that Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) significantly moderates the relationship between Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG), Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG), Corporations Age (CPTAGE) and the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services of listed corporations in Nigeria.

## Conclusion

This study considers the link between Audit Firm Magnitude (ADFMMG), Corporations Magnitude (CPTMAG), Corporations Age (CPTAGE) and the amount of Audit Fess (ADTFES) received by Auditors for Auditing services of listed corporations in Nigeria. Additionally, the moderating effect of Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure Count (KCAMD) on the alleged bond between ADFMMG, CPTMAG, CPTAGE and ADTFES was similarly studied. Generally, we found that KCAMD has significant influence on ADTFES. As well, measures of auditors and auditees' individualities were found to have joint significant effect on ADTFES. Furthermore, the study documents that KCAMD was capable of significantly influencing the relationship between the selected measures of auditors and auditees' individualities (ADFMMG, CPTMAG, CPTAGE) and ADTFES. Irrespective of the earlier recorded conclusions, we saw that regardless of the moderating effect of KCAMD on Model III, the moderator itself (KCAMD) along with other

variable (CPTAGE) and even the control variable (CPTLEV) could not on their own (that is, when considered in isolation) influence ADTFES significantly at 5% significant level. With these discernible outcomes, this study aptly recommends that while corporations strive to better their magnitude to form base for engaging any of the Big-4 or a combination of any of the Big-4 and non-Big-4, Audit Firms should undertake intensive and continuous professional training such that Key Corporate Audit Matters Disclosure would not constitute a grounds for the presumed higher audit fees trending.

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